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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - BOOK REMOVALS -
SCHOOL BOARDS - The United States Supreme Court has held
that removals of books from high school libraries may not be moti-
vated by the political, moral, or social tastes of school board mem-
bers, or a desire of the board to suppress access to ideas with
which they disagree.
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District v.
Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
In September, 1975, Island Trees board of education members
Ahrens, Martin, and Hughes,' petitioners, attended a conference
sponsored by Parents of New York United (PONYU),2 an organi-
zation of parents concerned about education legislation in the
State of New York.3 At the conference, they obtained a list of
books considered unsuitable for school students.4 It was deter-
mined that nine of these books were available in the high school
library,3 and one in the junior high school library."
In a February, 1976, meeting with the school superintendent and
the principals of the schools, the board asked that the listed books
be removed from the library shelves and delivered to the board
offices so that the members could read them. This action received
media attention, prompting a board press release characterizing
the books as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semetic [sic],
1. Petitioners were the Board of Education of the Island Trees Union Free School
District, Board members Christina Fasulo, Patrick Hughes, Richard Melchers, Richard
Michaels and Louis Nessim, and Board President and Vice-President Richard Ahrens and
Frank Martin. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct.
2799, 2802 (1982).
2. There was some confusion as to the name of this group; the court of appeals called
them People of New York United. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School
Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 406 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
3. 102 S. Ct. at 2802.
4. Id.
5. These nine books were: Slaughter House Five, by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; The Naked
Ape, by Desmond Morris; Down These Mean Streets, by Piri Thomas; Best Short Stories
by Negro Writers, edited by Langston Hughes; Go Ask Alice, Anonymous; Laughing Boy,
by Oliver LaFarge; Black Boy, by Richard Wright; A Hero Ain't Nothin' But a Sandwich,
by Alice Childress; Soul On Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver. 102 S. Ct. at 2803 n.3.
6. Id. The book available in the junior high school library was A Reader for Writers,
edited by Jerome Archer. In addition, The Fixer, by Bernard Malamud, was included in the




and just plain filthy,"8 and claiming that the board had an obliga-
tion to protect the students from such a moral danger.9
Shortly thereafter, the board appointed a book review committee
of four parents and four school staff members to consider the
"educational suitability," "good taste," "relevance," and "appro-
priateness to age and grade level" of the books and recommend
whether they should be retained. 0 The committee made a report
to the board recommending retention of five of the listed books,"
and removal of two others."2 They could not agree on two of the
books,' 3 took no position on one," and recommended that one be
made available only with parental approval." The board's decision,
however, was to return only one book to the high school library
without restriction," to make another available with parental ap-
proval, and to remove the remaining books.'8
Respondents then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 198319
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, alleging that the books had been removed not because they
were lacking in educational value, but because particular passages
in them offended board members' personal political, social, and
moral standards.2 0 This, they claimed, denied them their rights
under the first amendment."' Respondents sought a declaration
that the board's action was unconstitutional with preliminary and
8. The full text of this press release is set forth in Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees
Union Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980),
afl'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
9. 102 S. Ct. at 2803.
10. Id.
11. Id. The Fixer, Laughing Boy, Black Boy, Go Ask Alice, and Best Short Stories by
Negro Writers were recommended for retention. Id. n.5.
12. The Naked Ape and Down These Mean Streets. Id. n.6.
13. Soul on Ice and A Hero Ain't Nothin' But a Sandwich. Id. n.7.
14. A Reader for Writers. Id. n.8.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 2803. Slaughter House Five. Id. n.9.
16. Laughing Boy. Id. n.10.
17. Black Boy. Id. n.11.
18. Id. at 2803-04.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
20. 102 S. Ct. at 2804.
21. Id.
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permanent injunctive relief ordering the board to return the books
and not to interfere with their use in the curriculum.2"
The district court granted summary judgment to the board,
based on the court's conclusion that the board's actions were moti-
vated by its conservative educational policy and its belief that the
books were educationally unsuitable.23 The court rejected the re-
spondents' first amendment claim, relying on an earlier holding
that courts should not intrude in the daily operations of school sys-
tems in the absence of clear interference with constitutional
rights.24
The district court's judgment was reversed by a three-judge
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, each judge filing a separate opinion.25 Judge Sifton, sitting by
designation, delivered the judgment of the court. He stated that
evidence indicating that the book removal decisions were based on
board members' personal standards of morality and politics, to-
gether with the fact that no clear substantive or procedural guide-
lines had governed the removal process, created an inference that
the members were not acting in the students' best interests, but
out of a desire to impose their own views.26 The court concluded
that plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of a first amend-
ment violation, and should have been given an opportunity to pro-
ceed with their claims; it therefore remanded to the district court
for trial.2 There was a strong dissent by Circuit Judge Mansfield, 8
in which he asserted that Presidents Council District 25 v. Com-
munity School Board No. 2529 should not have been overruled, and
that the board's action was part of its usual regulatory function
and in no way a violation of the students' first amendment rights.30
Petition by the board for certiorari was granted. 1 The judgment of
the court of appeals was affirmed, in a five/four decision generating
seven separate opinions.32
22. Id.
23. 474 F. Supp. at 392.
24. Id. at 395-97, (quoting Presidents Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972)).
25. 638 F.2d 404 (1980).
26. Id. at 416.
27. Id. at 418.
28. Id. at 418-31.
29. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). See infra notes 241-49
and accompanying text.
30. 638 F.2d at 431.
31. 102 S. Ct. 384 (1982).
32. 102 S. Ct. at 2802. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court, joined by Justice Marshall
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Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court.33 He em-
phasized the limited nature of both the procedural and the sub-
stantive aspects of the case. 34 Justice Brennan acknowledged pre-
cedent for constitutionally restricting state control over the
curriculum and the classroom," but distinguished the instant case,
which involved neither textbooks nor compulsory courses.36 The
board had sought to regulate only library books, not required read-
ing materials,3 7 and the action before the Court was limited to the
issue of book removal, not book acquisition.8 In addition, Justice
Brennan emphasized the fact that the procedural status of the case
was such that the Court could reverse the court of appeals' judg-
ment and reinstate summary judgment in favor of petitioners only
if it determined that "there (was) no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact," and petitioners were "entitled to judgment as a matter
of law."
3 9
Justice Brennan stated the issue in the form of two questions:
first, did the first amendment in any way restrict the board's dis-
cretion in removing library books? If so, did the affidavits and
other evidentiary materials before the district court, when con-
strued in respondents' favor, raise a genuine issue of fact as to
whether those limitations were exceeded?40 He stated that affirma-
tive answers to both questions would dictate affirmance of the
judgment of the court of appeals, while a negative answer to either
and Justice Stevens. Justice Blackmun concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.
Justice White concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Powell,
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, dissented. Justice Powell dissented separately, as
did Justice Rehnquist, who was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell. Justice
O'Connor also filed a dissenting opinion.
33. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens, and by Jus-
tice Blackmun in all but pt. II-A-(1). Id. at 2802.
34. Id. at 2805.
35. Id. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (declaring unconstitutional a
state law prohibiting the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution in state-supported
schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state statute forbidding teachers from
providing foreign language instruction to students below a certain grade level struck down
on fourteenth amendment due process grounds).
36. 102 S. Ct. at 2805.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Justice Brennan stated that doubts as to the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party in a case such as
this, and inferences from underlying factors viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motioui. 102 S. Ct. at 2806. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970);
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
40. 102 S. Ct. at 2806.
1058 Vol. 21:1055
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would require reversal.4 ' He examined these questions in turn.
In the first section 42 of his opinion, Justice Brennan addressed
the question of whether the first amendment imposed any limita-
tions on the board's discretion to remove books from the school
libraries. 4s He began by outlining the history of the Court's adher-
ence to the principle that, under most circumstances, control of
public education rests with the discretion of local authorities, 4 and
the Court's recognition that public schools have a key role in the
preparation of students as citizens, through the inculcation of
moral, social and political values. 5 While these factors combine to
give local school boards substantial authority to promote commu-
nity values, Justice Brennan reiterated the Court's belief that the
exercise of such authority must comport with an understanding of
students' first amendment rights.46
Justice Brennan found the origin of this belief in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,4 7 in which the Court rea-
soned that it is because the school is educating students for citi-
zenship that it must perform its guiding role within the mandates
of the Constitution, for students cannot learn to value principles
the school feels free to ignore.48 He also referred to Epperson v.
Arkansas,49 in which the Court emphasized the importance of free
41. Id.
42. Part II-A-(1). 102 S. Ct. at 2806. Justice Blackmun did not join the plurality in
this section.
43. Id.
44. Id. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(suspension of students for wearing black armbands in class in a protest against the Viet-
nam War was an infringement of their right to free speech); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidation, under fourteenth
amendment, of state statute requiring all children between ages eight and sixteen to attend
public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), see supra note 35.
45. 102 S. Ct. at 2806. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979) In Ambach,
the Court held that it was not violative of equal protection to deny resident aliens certifica-
tion as public school teachers, as the governmental function of the school involves the
teacher's promotion of civic virtues and is so bound up with the operations of the state as to
permit exclusion of persons who have not become part of the process of self-government.
46. 102 S. Ct. at 2806-07.
47. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (requirement that students salute the flag and recite the
pledge of allegiance held beyond the constitutional limitations on the power of local authori-
ties and an improper restriction of first amendment rights).
48. 102 S. Ct. at 2807. In Barnette, the Court stated: "That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes." 319 U.S. at 637.
49. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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speech and inquiry in the school setting,50 and Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,51 which stressed
that school officials must exercise their authority within first
amendment limits.52 In the context of these cases, stated Justice
Brennan, students' first amendment rights were held safe from
abridgment - whether the justification for the attempted limita-
tion was "national unity" or "fear of disturbance." 3
The role of the courts in protecting students' first amendment
freedoms was defined in Epperson v. Arkansas:54 courts may inter-
vene in school system operations only where "basic constitutional
values" have been "directly and sharply implicated. ' 55 Justice
Brennan believed that intervention was appropriate in this case
because of the potential effect of the book removals on the right to
receive protected information.5 6 Justice Brennan stated that, in the
past, the Court had protected not only individual self-expression
but also the public's access to knowledge and information. He
stated that this "right to receive ideas" is an inherent corollary of
constitutionally guaranteed rights of free speech and press, stem-
ming from the sender's first amendment right to transmit, and
serving as a necessary predicate to the recipient's exercise of his
own rights.58 The right to receive prepares citizens generally, and
students in particular, for meaningful participation in the political
process.
59
Justice Brennan pointed out that the right of students to receive
information, as recognized in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
50. Id. at 104. The duty of federal courts is to "apply the First Amendment's mandate
in our educational system where essential to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of
speech and inquiry." Id.
51. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
52. Id. at 507. The Court in Tinker concluded that students do not "shed their rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.
53. 102 S. Ct. at 2807. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. at
640-41; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. at 508-09.
54. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
55. Id. at 104.
56. 102 S. Ct. at 2807-08.
57. Id. at 2808. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
(holding unconstitutional a Massachusetts criminal statute forbidding certain expenditures
by banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum
proposals; commercial speech found constitutionally protected as furthering society's inter-
est in free exchange of commercial information); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(finding unconstitutional a Georgia statute making mere private possession of obscene mate-
rial a crime).




Community School District," is limited by the realities of the
school environment, 61 but emphasized the special role of the school
library.2 He viewed the library as a place used by the student for
self-enrichment and free inquiry into all subjects, and thus as a
particularly appropriate forum for the recognition of students' first
amendment rights.63 Justice Brennan also noted the totally volun-
tary character of library use." While the need to inculcate values
might well justify the board's absolute control over the compulsory
curriculum, such control would be inappropriate in the library's at-
mosphere of unrestricted inquiry. 5
Having concluded that there were first amendment limitations
on the school board's decision in the area of library book removals,
Justice Brennan next examined the extent of these limitations.6
He reviewed precedent to support his contention that, while signif-
icant discretion exists, it is not to be exercised in a partisan or
political manner. 7 Justice Brennan proposed situations in which a
Democratic school board might remove all books by or in favor of
Republicans, or a white school board, in a racially motivated ac-
tion, might remove all books by blacks, and inferred from these
examples that the constitutional issue to be examined pertained to
the suppression of ideas.63 He suggested that the relevant inquiry
was whether the school board intended to deny students access to
ideas with which the board disagreed, and how decisive a factor
this intent was in the removal decision." Other motivations, such
as a concern with the vulgarity or the educational suitability of the
60. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) ("students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipi-
ents of only that which the State chooses to communicate").
61. 102 S. Ct. at 2808-09. Those realities, as seen by the Court in Tinker, involve the
fact that student exercise of first amendment rights may come into conflict with the rule-
making power of school officials, which has been recognized by the Court. 393 U.S. at 506-
07.




66. See pt. II-A-(2) of Justice Brennan's opinion. Id.
67. 102 S. Ct. at 2809. Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(local school board limited in discretion to refuse to rehire non-tenured teacher where action
based on teacher's exercise of first amendment rights in making school principal's memoran-
dum public); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("[TIhe First Amendment. .. does not tolerate laws which cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom"); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).




removed books would be "perfectly permissible. 7
In concluding his examination of the limitations imposed upon a
board's discretion in removing books, Justice Brennan emphasized
the fact that the Court's concern was with suppression of ideas;
therefore, nothing in the opinion was to affect the discretion of
school boards in the area of book acquisition.71 The limitation
placed on removal decisions, however, was that they could not be
based simply on dislike of the ideas presented in the books, or on
an attempt to prescribe an orthodox way of thought.
7
Justice Brennan then addressed the second question posed by
the case: whether the Court might properly reverse the judgment
of the court of appeals and reinstate the district court's summary
judgment in favor of the board.73 The question to be considered
was whether the evidentiary materials presented to the district
court, when construed in respondent Pico's favor, raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether petitioners' decision to remove
the books exceeded constitutional limitations on their discretion.7,
Justice Brennan analyzed the issue first from a substantive per-
spective. He noted Pico's claim that the removal decision was
based upon the personal values of the board members, and mem-
bers' conclusion that the books were "anti-American, '' 5 and drew
attention to the fact that the board, in its own explanation for the
removals, conceded these issues, asserting that the books were
"anti-American" and "offensive to . . . Americans in general."'7 6
He emphasized the fact that while the book committee's decisions
were made on ostensibly permissible grounds,77 these recommenda-
70. Id. Justice Brennan here cited the transcript of oral argument, where respondents
had conceded this point. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
73. See pt. II-B. 102 S. Ct. at 2810.
74. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (1980), which provides in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, an-
swers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Id.
75. 102 S. Ct. at 2811.
76. Id. See 474 F. Supp. at 390. See also 102 S. Ct. at 2811 n.25 for Petitioner Martin's
statement on the anti-Americanism of A Hero Ain't Nothin' But a Sandwich, which identi-
fies George Washington as a slave owner: "I believe it is anti-American to present one of the
nation's heroes . . . in such a negative and obviously one-sided life." Id. (citing Deposition
of Petitioner Martin at 22).
77. That is, educational suitability, good taste, relevance and appropriateness to age
and grade level. 102 S. Ct. at 2811.
1062 Vol. 21:1055
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tions were ignored by the board."' Finally, he noted that A Reader
for Writers was removed although neither vulgar nor indecent.
7 9
While these factors were not in themselves decisive, Justice Bren-
nan stated that when combined with the fact that the removal de-
cision ignored expert views, contravened the procedures advocated
by the school superintendent," and appeared to have been based
not on an independent review of library contents but on the
PONYU list, these irregularities added to suspicions about peti-
tioners' motivations.81
For these reasons, the plurality opinion concluded, the Court
could not rule that petitioners were entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law, but believed instead that an issue of material fact ex-
isted as to the constitutional validity of the motivation behind the
book removal decision, which required resolution by the finder of
fact.82 Thus, the decision of the court of appeals was affirmed.83
Justice Blackmun concurred in part and concurred in the judg-
ment." While he agreed with the standard established by the plu-
rality to guide the proceedings on remand, he viewed differently
the first amendment right involved.85 He found the case to be ex-
tremely complex in its presentation of two opposing constitutional
principles: the important role of the public schools in the inculca-
tion of fundamental values, 8 and the fact that in fulfilling this role
the school must operate within first amendment confines.8 7
Justice Blackmun reviewed cases which placed limits on the dis-
cretion of school boards where their actions would result in the
imposition of a particular system of thought,ss although noting
78. Id.
79. Id. See 638 F.2d 404, 428 n.6 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
80. 102 S. Ct. at 2812. See 638 F.2d at 408. The court of appeals set forth a memoran-
dum from Superintendent Richard Morrow in which Morrow stated that a policy had been
established by the Board for use when objections were raised to a book. This policy called
for the superintendent to appoint a committee to study the book and make recommenda-
tions on it. Id.




85. Id. Justice Blackmun appeared to focus his attention on conflicting policies influ-
encing the school board rather than on the relation of these policies to the individual rights
of the students.
86. 102 S. Ct. at 2812-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
87. 102 S. Ct. at 2813 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
88. Id. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)
1983 1063
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that none of these cases involved choice of curriculum or curricular
materials.89 He placed particular emphasis on West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette9" for the proposition that school
authorities are not to impose uniformity of thought.9 ' Drawing
from these cases and others dealing more generally with content-
based regulation of speech,92 Justice Blackmun articulated a gen-
eral principle: the state (or school board) may not suppress expo-
sure to ideas - for the sole purpose of suppressing exposure to
those ideas - absent sufficiently compelling reasons. 3
Justice Blackmun viewed this case as involving a narrower prin-
ciple than the "right to receive information" identified by the plur-
ality." He would not have inferred that the State has an obligation
to provide ideas, as a right to receive might imply, 5 nor did he feel
that the school library should be exempt from the inculcative func-
tion of the school." He suggested instead that certain forms of
state discrimination among ideas are improper: those based on par-
tisan or political concerns.9e Justice Blackmun felt that while the
unique inculcative function of the school limited the extent to
which official decisions should be restrained, that same function
made it imperative that some first amendment limitations be rec-
ognized so that orthodoxy would not be imposed."
For these reasons, Justice Blackmun believed the proper holding
would be that school officials may not remove books for the pur-
pose of restricting access to the ideas or perspectives contained
("students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the state
chooses to communicate"); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidity of
New York attempt to remove "subversives" from university academic positions; the first
amendment "does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom"); West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (schools may not "pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion").
89. 102 S. Ct. at 2813 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
90. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
91. 102 S. Ct. at 2813 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
92. Id. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
93. 102 S. Ct. at 2813 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (emphasis in original).
94. 102 S. Ct. 2813-14. See id. at 2827-35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) for an extensive
discussion of the concept of "right to receive."
95. 102 S. Ct. at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). See also id. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
96. 102 S. Ct. at 2814 & n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).




therein when the removal is based on disapproval of the ideas in-
volved.99 Such suppression, stated the Justice, clearly would be
contrary to the first amendment. 100 Justice Blackmun would not
interfere with the right of school officials to choose among books
for politically neutral reasons: relevancy, better writing, space or
financial limitations, offensive language,' inappropriateness for
age group, presence of ideas dangerous to the public welfare, 02 or
belief that one subject is more deserving of emphasis than an-
other.10' Disapproval of a novel or unpopular viewpoint would not
be sufficient.
Justice Blackmun addressed several of the issues raised in Jus-
tice Rehnquist's dissent.'" He did not agree that the concept of
"suppression of ideas" was without merit when purposeful sup-
pression was tied to first amendment rights.10 5 Justice Blackmun
gave the example of the removal of a foreign policy treatise from
an elementary school library because it was too advanced for the
students as an action not taken of the purpose of suppressing
ideas. 06 He would not consider so clear-cut the removal of the
treatise based on a decision that it was anti-American. 0 7 Also, Jus-
tice Blackmun was not comfortable with Justice Rehnquist's dis-
tinction between the state as sovereign and the state as educa-
tor, 08 since the first amendment applies to all state activities, 0 9
and restrains the state from content-based restrictions and sup-
pression Of access to certain ideas in all contexts."0
The tension which Justice Blackmun saw at the heart of the is-
sue was between indoctrination of values as a purpose of public
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2815 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
102. 102 S. Ct. at 2815 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
103. 102 S. Ct. at 2815 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). These reasons appear, on their face, to conform to the reasons given by the Board for
the removals. See 638 F.2d at 423 (Mansfield, J. dissenting) (citing the Board's testimony as
to the reasons for the removals).
104. 102 S. Ct. at 2815 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). See id. at 2834-35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).






110. Id. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
1983 1065
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education, and the limits to be placed on school board discre-
tion."' While acknowledging that school officials may develop a
curriculum aimed at instilling certain values,"' he maintained that
they could not intentionally shield students from ideas not gener-
ally accepted in the community. Justice Blackmun also agreed with
the Chief Justice that applying the principles developed by the
plurality might be difficult in particular cases." 3 He concluded,
however, that while the sparseness of the record in the instant case
made it difficult to analyze the impact of the plurality's decision,
and might support those who felt that the case should not have
been taken, it was necessary that the Court decide the case before
it." He joined, therefore, in all but part II-A-(1) of the plurality
opinion."1
Justice White concurred in the judgment," 6 based on the conclu-
sion of the court of appeals that a material issue of fact remained
as to the reasons underlying the book removals, precluding a grant
of summary judgment.17 He expressed the hope that a trial would
result, and produce a full record and findings on critical points. 118
Justice White deemed it improper for the plurality to have
reached the constitutional issue of first amendment limits on dis-
cretionary book removals, since there was an absence of fact on the
record on which to proceed." 9 He would have preferred to remand
for the district court to issue an opinion. Only if the district court's
judgment were followed by an appeal, dissatisfaction with the
judgment of the court of appeals and a grant of certiorari would
Justice White address the constitutional question.12 0 In support of
his stance, Justice White offered two cases: Kennedy v. Silas
111. 102 S. Ct. at 2815 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
112. Id. at 2815-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See Mineraville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting)
(school may require study of government and history to "inspire patriotism and love of
country").
113. 102 S. Ct. at 2816 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
114. Id.
115. Id. Part II-A-(1) focused primarily on the articulation of the "right to receive" in
the context of the case. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
116. 102 S. Ct. at 2816 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
117. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.





Mason Co.12' and Dombrowski v. Eastland,1 2 2 in which the Court
remanded for production of a fuller record on which to base its
decision. ' He felt that this approach was particularly imperative
in a case involving unexplored first amendment areas.
1 2 4
Chief Justice Burger dissented, in an opinion joined by Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.1 2 5 He indicated that he believed
that the plurality wrongly focused on the fact that the decision to
examine the books was sparked by the observations of a "politi-
cally conservative organization" rather than accepting the district
court's observation that the parties were in basic agreement as to
the reasons for the removal. 120 He believed the plurality, by hold-
ing that a school board's determination of library contents was a
proper subject for judicial review, would cast the Court in the role
of a "super censor" of school libraries.12 7 The Chief Justice felt
that the basic issues in the case were whether school boards are to
be administered by elected officials or by teenage students and fed-
eral judges, and whether decisions concerning library contents can
be based on concepts of morality, good taste and educational rele-
vance. 1 8 The plurality's structuring of this case as a first amend-
ment problem was, the Chief Justice felt, a technique for imposing
its own views on proper book selection. 2 9 Further, he pointed out
that the case presented a possible concern over mootness.5 0
Chief Justice Burger agreed that students have a right to speech
and expression in educational contexts."' Without a showing that
student rights had been restricted in some way, however, he was
unable to accept the plurality's suggestion that students have an
enforceable right - a first amendment "entitlement" - to receive
121. 334 U.S. 249, 257 (1948) ("We consider it the part of good judicial administration
to withhold decision of the ultimate questions involved in this case until this or another
record shall present a more solid basis of findings").
122. 387 U.S. 82, 84 (1967) ("In the absence of the factual refinement which can occur
only as a result of trial, we need not and, indeed, could not express judgment as to the legal
consequences").
123. 102 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
124. Id. at 2817 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
125. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See 474 F. Supp. at 392.
127. 102 S. Ct. at 2817 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commu-
nity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (so long as the educational process is not disrupted,
school cannot prohibit student expression of certain ideas); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (student cannot be compelled to salute the flag).
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information and ideas contained in school library books.3 2 He crit-
icized the plurality's use of school-related precedent 3 3 as a basis
for this right; one which he believed the Court had never previ-
ously recognized.' 3
Chief Justice Burger attacked the plurality's "right to receive"
argument on two fronts.135 He began by examining the right of the
sender, acknowledging that the government may not impose obsta-
cles between one who sends information and one who receives,'
or unreasonably restrain the expression of certain ideas.3 7 But
Chief Justice Burger made a distinction between not hindering
speech and affirmatively aiding it. He noted that the Court had
never held that a sender's right to convey information was abso-
lute,'" or that the government was required to help a sender reach
his audience.13 9
Next, the Chief Justice turned to the recipient. He asserted that
neither the "right to receive information and ideas"4 0 nor the ne-
cessity for an informed citizenry' 4 ' established a right to have par-
ticular books retained in school libraries.' 4 The Chief Justice sug-
gested that recognition of such a right would, by logical extension,
require the government to provide all citizens with access to infor-
132. 102 S. Ct. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
133. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
134. 102 S. Ct. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2818-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down statute declaring it
unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise prescription drug prices). See
also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972), where the Court stated that free-
dom of speech necessarily implies protection of the right to receive.
137. 102 S. Ct. at 2818 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
138. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See Rowan v. United States Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding homeowner's right not to receive erotic materi-
als). A similar argument was made by court of appeals Judge Mansfield in his dissent in
Pico, 638 F.2d at 429, to assert that the importance of Presidents Council v. Community
School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (1972), had not been lessened by Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). He stated:
Here no speaker exists claiming a constitutional right to address the students with
respect to the text of the removed books ... since under Virginia State Board the
right of students to receive information is no greater than that of the speaker to
furnish it, the decision has no application to the facts of this case.
638 F.2d at 429.
139. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 54 (1969).
141. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See id. at 2808.
142. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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mation."' Additionally, he believed that the plurality had misused
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,""
a case restricting the limitations which could be placed on stu-
dents' rights to free expression, to support an affirmative duty to
supply information."" It was necessary, stated the Chief Justice, to
distinguish actions by the government which would "contract the
spectrum of available knowledge ' '"1 from actions in which the gov-
ernment chooses not to be the channel for certain information.
14 7
He rejected the notion that having the government provide contin-
uing access to particular books was a right established by the first
amendment or prior decisions by the Court." '
In the next part of his opinion, Chief Justice Burger took note of
the fact that essentially all school activity involves transmitting in-
formation. 9 The Chief Justice pointed out the Court's recognition
of the public school's inculcative function.1 50 He would assure the
fulfillment of that function by leaving content-based selection of
academic materials to elected school boards.15 According to the
Chief Justice, to vest this selection power in the Court, rather than
in a body which reflects the standard of the local community,
would be contrary to the idea of democratic government. 152 The
Chief Justice summarized the standard established by the plurality
as one which sought to prevent the partisan exercise of school
board discretion, but which permitted decisions based on a book's
"pervasive vulgarity" or its educational unsuitability." s The Chief
Justice did not see how "educational suitability" could operate as a
standard without content-based decisions being made; nor did he
see why vulgarity had to be "pervasive" before it could be found
inappropriate.'" In addition, while the plurality would not permit
political factors to motivate removals, the Chief Justice asserted
that all decisions in the realm of public education are in some
sense political.155 He concluded that what the plurality had identi-
143. Id.
144. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
145. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
146. Id. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
147. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149.. Id.
150. Id. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
151. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 2820 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 74 (1979) (public education "go[es] to
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fled as valid reasons for book removal involved, nonetheless, basi-
cally partisan judgments. " If such judgments must be made, the
Chief Justice would rather they be made not by the courts, but by
elected school officials, who are chosen by and responsive to the
communities they serve.15 7 He believed that the school board's ac-
countability to its constituents would prevent abuse of its discre-
tion, and pointed out that even if the community failed to man-
date the presence of a book in its schools, it could obtain the book
from private, non-school sources.'
In part 1,1" Chief Justice Burger criticized the distinction made
by the plurality between text books and optional library materials.
He found it illogical that optional materials would be subject to
greater scrutiny before removal than would texts, despite the fact
that decisions about selection or removal of texts would be more
likely to impose a "pall of orthodoxy" over the classroom.6 0 Chief
Justice Burger was dissatisfied with the distinction between acqui-
sition and removal of books under a "suppression of ideas" stan-
dard as well.' 6' He pointed out the anomaly of the "book tenure"
concept, which had been discussed by the district court in Pico. 62
The Chief Justice did not see how the decision not to acquire a
book is less a suppression of ideas than the decision to remove it
- yet the plurality had placed no restriction on the first decision
while "locking in" a school board to books already acquired unless
their removals were properly justified.""
In summary, the Chief Justice stated that he could see no consti-
tutional basis for these various distinctions, and could not agree
that the Constitution mandated that judges, not school boards,
the heart of representative government").
156. 102 S. Ct. at 2820 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 2820-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also id. at 2820 n.§, in which Chief
Justice Burger stated that this case was an example of "super censorship" in its insistence
on a remand so that the plurality's standard could be applied.




162. Id. Justice Burger pointed to the district court's decision. 474 F. Supp. at 395-96.
The district court had reaffirmed the standard of Presidents Council v. Community School
Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972), rejecting book tenure. The district court argued that
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), Right to Read
Defense Comm. of Chelsea v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978),
and Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979), while purporting to
distinguish Presidents Council, simply adopted the book tenure concept rejected by the
Second Circuit. 474 F. Supp. at 395.
163. 102 S. Ct. at 2821 n.8 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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parents and teachers, should regulate the standards of morality
and vulgarity in the classroom.'"
Justice Powell dissented, based on his interpretation of the role
of the school board in the system of government, 6 and his disap-
proval of the implication he found in the plurality opinion that any
student might, in the future, be able to invoke the power of the
court to overrule an elected school board's educational decision.,
He discussed the intensely local nature of the school board, and
stated that resolving educational policy disputes through litigation
rather than through the decisions of bodies responsive to the peo-
ple they serve could only lead to a lessening of school board
effectiveness.""
Justice Powell voiced criticisms similar to those made by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, stating that he could find no
constitutional support for the "right to receive ideas" in school,'"
nor did he find guidance from the plurality as to acceptable stan-
dards by which the courts are to oversee, and school boards to
make, discretionary decisions in the area of curriculum.1 9 The plu-
rality's formulation - that decisions cannot be made in a "nar-
rowly partisan or political manner" - was seen by Justice Powell
as a "standardless standard" comparable to the "chancellor's
foot. 1 70 He was also reluctant to allow students the right to chal-
lenge book removals, because he could not ascertain a reasonable
limitation upon the areas in which students would be permitted to
challenge educational decisions on the basis of a "right to receive
ideas." 17 1
Justice Powell asserted that the plurality's reasoning was contra-
dictory.1 72 While the plurality accepted the Court's traditional view
that the public school is an important means of transmitting dem-
ocratic values and societal standards to prepare children for partic-
ipation in the political system, 7 and had, during the same term,
164. Id. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
165. 102 S. Ct. at 2822 (Powell, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
169. 102 S. Ct. at 2822 (Powell, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2822-23 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell suggested that the plurality
could not meaningfully distinguish a book removal challenge from a challenge of the deci-
sion not to purchase a book, of decisions as to which courses could be added to or removed
from the curriculum, or of what a classroom teacher might elect to teach or not to teach.
172. 102 S. Ct. at 2823 (Powell, J., dissenting).
173. Id. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
1983 1071
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 21:1055
extended the right to such preparation to the children of illegal
aliens,' 7 ' it penalized a school board for exercising its discretion in
selecting the values and standards to be conveyed.' 7 5 Justice Pow-
ell felt that the plurality denied the school board the right to re-
frain from promoting indecency, advocacy of violence or racism, or
degradations of the individual - values which never have been ac-
cepted in the American system.' He stated that the removal of
the nine books at issue here did not suggest a book burning
mentality; instead, he believed that the plurality's decision was an
interference with democratic institutions. 7
7
Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Powell.'78 He began by addressing the procedural posture
of the case, which he believed had received too little attention in
the plurality opinion. 17  Justice Rehnquist stated that, in light of
Rule 9(g) of the local rules of the district court, Pico, having had
summary judgment entered against him, was entitled to have had
the facts set forth in his Rule 9(g) statement accepted for review
purposes. 180 Thus, Justice Rehnquist believed Justice Brennan
should not have gone outside of Pico's Rule 9(g) statement of facts
to review the case."'
Justice Rehnquist stated that, considering only respondent
174. 102 S. Ct. at 2823 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell was referring to Plyler v.
Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982), which upheld the rights of children of illegal aliens to attend
the public schools.
175. 102 S. Ct. at 2823 (Powell, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id. Justice Powell attached as an appendix Judge Mansfield's summary of ex-
cerpts from the books involved in this case. Id. at 2823-27. These excerpts were quotations
from each of the books, with particular emphasis on vulgar language and sexual situations.
See also 638 F.2d at 419-22 n.1 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
178. 102 S. Ct. at 2827 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
179. Id. See also id. n.1 where Justice Rehnquist detailed his reasons for disagreeing
with Justice White's conclusion that the constitutional issues need not have been reached.
180. 102 S. Ct. at 2827-28 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Local Rule 9(g) provides:
Upon any motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, there shall be annexed to the notice of motion a separate, short and
concise statement of the material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a
general issue to be tried.
The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate,
short and concise statement of the material facts as to which it is contended that
there exists a genuine issue to be tried.
All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving
party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement required to
be served by the opposing party.
E.D.N.Y.R. 9(g).
181. 102 S. Ct. at 2828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Pico's description of the facts, he could find no basis for Justice
Brennan's concern over "suppression of ideas."' s He emphasized
respondents' admission that the books involved profanity, explicit
sex, bad grammar, and anti-American or religiously, racially or eth-
nically offensive statements, and respondents' agreement that
while the books were excluded from use in the school there was no
effort to prevent discussion of them, or of their themes.' 3 For this
reason, Justice Rehnquist believed that Justice Brennan was un-
warranted in assessing this case, on its facts, in terms of "suppres-
sion of ideas." The extreme suppression of ideas suggested by Jus-
tice Brennan8s' would be dealt with by Justice Rehnquist when -
if ever - it arose. 85
Justice Rehnquist next discussed the fact that the government
acts in different roles, with restrictions on it as a sovereign 86 which
may not have the same first amendment implications as are pre-
sent when it acts in other capacities.' When the state acts as edu-
cator, stated Justice Rehnquist, it makes decisions concerning cur-
riculum, books, and faculty so that it can carry out its inculcative
responsibilities. These decisions, when made by the school board,
will be based on members' personal values or the values of the
community, or the board can choose to have the choices made by
experts.'88 Justice Rehnquist voiced agreement with the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Corp."9 that local boards could properly use their personal
moral views in making educational decisions. 90 When a board uses
182. Id.
183. Id. See also Presidents Council v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289, 292 (2d
Cir. 1972), where a distinction was made between removing a book from the library and
totally restricting access to it.
184. 102 S. Ct. at 2829 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note
68 for Justice Brennan's examples of a Democratic school board suppressing Republican
works, or a white board denying access to books by or about blacks.
185. 102 S. Ct. at 2829 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
186. Id. For example, on the record before the court, Justice Rehnquist suggested that
a town council could not have prohibited the sale of these books by private booksellers
within the municipality. Id.
187. Id. For example, the state as employer could regulate the speech of its employees
in a way it could not regulate the speech of the general public, Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968), and could act to prohibit expressive conduct on its property as could a
private owner. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1967).
188. 102 S. Ct. at 2829 & n.5 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
189. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (the indoctrinational responsibility of the schools
vested the state with an interest outweighing students' rights to academic freedom; remand-
ing to permit showing of whether impermissible orthodoxy had been imposed).
190. Id. at 1308.
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its discretion in the making of such decisions, it does not exclude
particular books or subjects from the community at large, asserted
Justice Rehnquist; the materials are available elsewhere, and the
exclusions thus do not raise the same first amendment concerns in
the school context as they would if they were sovereign actions.191
Justice Rehnquist next considered the "right to receive" issue.
He found illogical the plurality's limitations on this right: that it
exists only in the library and only as to ideas in previously ac-
quired books; that it does not extend to permitting restraints on
decisions not to acquire; that it limits permissible reasons for re-
moval. Any decision not to acquire or to remove a book, no matter
what the reason, is a denial of access; to Justice Rehnquist, logic
would require extension of the plurality's concern to all of these
sorts of decisions. ' His primary objection was not to the limita-
tions, however, but to the existence of the right at all - an exis-
tence he found unsupported by precedent and inconsistent with
the role of elementary and secondary education.'" Justice Rehn-
quist pointed out that previous decisions concerning student rights
dealt with the right of self-expression, such as a symbolic armband
display, 94 or a refusal to participate in the flag salute. 95 He ac-
knowledged that the Court had recognized a right to receive in
some settings, but, while the plurality read. Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District' to extend the right to
the school context, Justice Rehnquist believed this interpretation
was incorrect.197 He also found no sender's right in the school con-
text upon which to base the students' reciprocal right to receive.198
Additionally, stated Justice Rehnquist, a denial of access is a limit
on the recipient's exercise of his own first amendment rights only
when that denial is nearly complete, as it was in the right to re-
ceive cases reviewed by Justice Brennan " - a situation clearly
191. 102 S. Ct. at 2830 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
192. Id.
193. Id. Justice Rehnquist's analysis of these issues was similar to that undertaken by
the Chief Justice. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
194. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
195. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
196. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
197. 102 S. Ct. at 2831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See id. at 2808.
198. Id. at 2831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 2831 n.7 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). These "right to receive" cases were
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (Massachusetts law prohibiting corporate
expenditures to express viewpoints on ballot issues); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(Georgia law criminalizing all private possession of obscene materials); Griswold v. Connect-
icut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (law criminalizing all use of contraceptive devices or actions encour-
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distinguishable from the instant case, where the books were readily
available elsewhere.
2 00
Justice Rehnquist stated that the inculcative nature of the pub-
lic school demands that students be exposed to ideas in a selective
and orderly way.20 1 At the elementary and secondary levels in par-
ticular, educators must make determinations as to which ideas are
relevant to the students' acquisition of knowledge and which are
not.2 0 2 A demand that all materials be made available in an eclectic
fashion would, in Justice Rehnquist's view, be fundamentally con-
tradictory to the basic nature of an inculcative education.
Justice Rehnquist criticized Justice Brennan's use of language
from a case on public libraries, 203 and from another on universities
and colleges, 20" as a basis for his assertion that school libraries are
a unique environment. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that school
libraries serve as supplements to the inculcative role of the public
school; they are geared toward the teaching of selected skills and
thus provide no forum for the exercise of a right to receive infor-
mation.20 He then returned to a point he had made earlier: that
the book removals did not violate the right to receive information
because the books at issue were available from non-school sources
- including the public library, where they were put on display for
public inspection following their removal from the schools. 6
Justice Rehnquist called attention to Justice Brennan's distinc-
tion between the removal of a previously acquired book and the
decision not to acquire a book at all.s He found that distinction
unsound, stating that both decisions are effective in denying access
to the book's contents.0 8 In addition, he asserted that the denial of
access to an idea is not necessarily the same as its suppression.20
The Justice read the plurality's opinion as justifying its distinction
aging such use); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (requiring persons re-
ceiving communist propaganda in the mails affirmatively to assert their desire to receive it);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (law prohibiting all door-to-door distribu-
tion of religious literature).
200. 102 S. Ct. at 2832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203.. Id. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
204. 102 S. Ct. at 2832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967).
205. 102 S. Ct. at 2832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2832-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
208. Id. See also supra note 162 for a discussion of the "book tenure" concept.
209. 102 S. Ct. at 2833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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between acquisition and removal on the grounds that the latter
was more visible and required greater conscious effort, but he be-
lieved that this was irrelevant if the Court's real concern was with
"suppression of ideas."21 0 He also felt that the "bad motive" test
proposed by the plurality was specious. In the face of concern with
a right to receive, the reason for denial of access should be irrele-
vant, as the result is the same. " ' Additionally, the Justice asserted
that not all restrictions on information received result in the impo-
sition of an orthodox system of thought.12
On the same basis, Justice Rehnquist could not understand the
standards used in the plurality's examination of the motives be-
hind removal decisions. He stated that he had believed that con-
tent-based restrictions on the marketplace of ideas were prohib-
ited, 18 yet removals for vulgarity or educational unsuitability,
permissible by the plurality's view, would require content
analysis. "
Justice Rehnquist criticized the plurality's use of the phrase
"suppression of ideas" as a catch-all rather than an analytical
tool.21 5 He believed that previous decisions under the first amend-
ment had provided sufficient guidance for the Court without re-
quiring the use of a formula which gave rise to different meanings
in disparate situations. 16 He advocated the standard used in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District2
1 7
that the prohibition of the expression of a particular idea is not
constitutionally permissible, absent a showing that the prohibition
is necessary to maintain order and preserve the learning environ-
ment.21 '8 He stated that it would be inappropriate to say that the
Island Trees School Board had suppressed the ideas of vulgarity
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2833-34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 2834 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269
(1981) (state university's exclusion from its facilities of religiously-oriented student group
violated fundamental principle that state regulation of speech should be content-neutral).
214. 102 S. Ct. at 2834 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
215. Id.
216. Id. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(court should not undertake "a complicated process of constitutional adjudication by a de-
ceptive formula"). Justice Rehnquist gave three examples of "suppression of ideas": a school
policy that no student, teacher, or library book would be permitted to criticize United
States foreign policy; a policy that current events would not be discussed in Latin class; a
teacher's illness requiring that the class forego the study of the most recent 20 years of
United States history.
217. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
218. Id. at 510-11.
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and profanity, for all they had in fact done was remove vulgar
books, not preclude discussion of them.219 Such a removal, stated
Justice Rehnquist, was, on respondents' version of the facts, 220 a
first amendment-protected decision based on educational
suitability.221.
Justice Rehnquist stated that his emphasis on the limitations
placed by the plurality on the right to receive ideas was not meant
to suggest that the limitations should be eliminated, but sought
only to suggest that the right is misplaced in the elementary and
secondary school setting.22 2 He stated that, similarly, his criticism
of the "suppression of ideas" formula was meant to show not that
such suppression is constitutionally permissible,22 but to suggest
the imprecision of the concept as an aid to decision-making.
2 2 4
Justice Rehnquist once again emphasized that he would recog-
nize less stringent regulations on the government as educator, par-
ticularly in the elementary and secondary school setting, than
those which apply to it in its sovereign role.2 25 When a school
board chooses not to offer a book or a course, stated the Justice, it
does not condemn that book or course, but only determines that it
will not be part of the knowledge inculcated by the school. 226
Under the Epperson v. Arkansas standard,227 Justice Rehnquist
believed the action taken by the school board in this case was ac-
ceptable, and indistinguishable from the variety of decisions made
by such boards every day on the basis of "personal values, morals
and tastes. 2 2 8 He concluded that, in this case, respondents' rights
of free speech and expression were not infringed, and by respon-
dents' own admission, no ideas had been suppressed.229
Justice O'Connor dissented.3 0 She felt that the plurality over-
looked the school board's role as educator, which requires many
219. 102 S. Ct. at 2834 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 2834-35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra notes 180-81 and accompa-
nying text.
221. 102 S. Ct. at 2835 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
222. Id. Justice Rehnquist emphasized again the difference between the public school
and institutions of higher learning. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
226. 102 S. Ct. at 2835 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
227. 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
228. 102 S. Ct. at 2835 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
230. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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decisions of the same character as book removal."' While Justice
O'Connor stated that she did not personally agree with the board's
choices in this particular case, she believed that it was the school
board's right to determine educational suitability, and accordingly
joined the Chief Justice in his dissent. 32
Underlying the cases in the area of book removal are two basic
principles: the right of local school boards to control the educa-
tional process, and the first amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and expression as they have come to be defined in the
school setting. In addition, the concepts of a "right to receive infor-
mation" and of "book tenure" have played an important role in
decisions in this area.
Local school boards typically operate under broad grants of
power, 33 and the courts have been somewhat reluctant to interfere
in their day-to-day decisions. The importance of the school's incul-
cative function is repeatedly emphasized; a corollary to that em-
phasis is that community-controlled boards are the arm of govern-
ment best suited to determine what values will be conveyed and to
control the flow of information to students. Three major cases not
,dealing with book removals are discussed frequently in the book
removal cases for their delineations of those situations in which the
courts will restrict the amount and type of control which school
boards may exert over matters involving students' first amendment
rights.23 '
In the early case of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,35 the Court held that a school could not compel a stu-
231. Id. For example, setting curriculum, selecting teachers, determining what library
books to purchase initially.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 1709 (McKinney 1970) which provides in pertinent
part:
§ 1709. Powers and Duties of Boards of Education The said board of education of
every union free school district shall have the power and it shall be its duty:
3. To have in all respects the superintendence, management and control of the
educational affairs of the district, and, therefore, shall have all the powers reasonably
granted expressly or by implication by this chapter or other statutes.
Id. 638 F.2d 404, 422 n.2 (1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), afl'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). See
also generally Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate
Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 373 (1969).
Generally, this right includes selection of texts and control of curriculum.
234. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
235. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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dent to salute the flag. The Court emphasized the discretionary
nature of the school board's function,"8 6 but declared that it was
essential that those who were training students to assume the role
of citizens not restrict those students in the exercise of their con-
stitutional rights.28 7 Twenty-five years later, in Epperson v. Arkan-
sas,2ss the Court, in invalidating a state statute prohibiting the
teaching of the Darwinian theory, stated that court intervention in
school operations was permissible only where conflicts arose in
which basic constitutional values were directly implicated.289 In an-
other decision stressing both the Court's commitment to preserv-
ing local control over educational decisions and its mandate that
such control not infringe on constitutionally protected areas, the
Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District240 held that students could -not be prohibited from wearing
black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam so long as they did
not actually disrupt the school environment. Both Epperson and
Tinker, while concerned with discretionary local authority, ac-
knowledged a broad concept of free speech in the school setting.
Prior to Pico, the leading case in the area of book removal in the
Second Circuit had been Presidents Council v. Community School
Board.41 In Presidents Council, the court of appeals found that
the record failed to establish any violationf of students' first
amendment rights in the school board's restriction of Down These
Mean Streets by Piri Thomas, an account of a Puerto Rican youth
growing up in New York City's East Side Barrio, from open access
on junior high school library shelves to direct loan access to stu-
dents' parents only.2 42 The court felt that the process of book se-
lection was ongoing, and that while there would be conflicts from
time to time, decisions would have to be made.2 43 Because the com-
munity school board had been given the responsibility for library
book selection,244 and because administrative procedures were
236. Id. at 637.
237. Id.
238. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
239. Id. at 104. Epperson, in dealing with what sorts of materials must be made avail-
able, presages the later emphasis on the "right to receive."
240. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
241. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
242. 457 F.2d at 290-91. This book is one of those involved in the controversy in Pico.
102 S. Ct. at 2803.
243. 457 F.2d at 291-92.
244. Id. at 290 (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-e(3) (McKinney 1970)). The statute
deals with "selection of text books and other instructional materials" and does not specifi-
cally mention library books. 457 F.2d at 290.
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available for review of library matters,2"5 the court did not find un-
usual circumstances justifying intervention under Epperson.
2 6 It
particularly emphasized that no one had been penalized by the re-
moval; that the book, its contents and the issues it raised could
still be discussed; and that the book was available for parents to
give to their children if they saw fit.24 7 The Presidents Council
court also clearly rejected any distinction between shelving and re-
moval of books, stating that it found no constitutional basis for
holding that a book could acquire "tenure" once in place on the
library shelf.24 8 A board empowered to select books could also re-
move them.240
The next major book removal case was Minarcini v. Strongsville
City School District.250 Minarcini involved the school board's re-
fusal to follow faculty recommendation to approve certain books
for use as texts or library books, its removal of books from the
library, and its issuance of a resolution prohibiting the use of these
books in class discussion or as supplemental reading251 - restric-
tions somewhat more broad than those involved in Presidents
Council. The court, while acknowledging the discretion of the
school board and its statutory power to purchase text books, 52
went beyond Presidents Council to examine not just the effect of
the book removals,' but the motivations of the board members who
had authorized them. 53 After extensively quoting school board
meeting minutes, 4 the court concluded that in the absence of any
explanation of the board's action which was neutral in first amend-
245. Id. (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 310(5)-(6) (McKinney 1970)).
246. 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (that is, a conflict "directly and sharply implicat[ing] basic
constitutional values").
247. 457 F.2d at 292. See also 409 U.S. 998, 999 (1972) for Justice Douglas' dissent to
the denial of certiorari in this case: "At school the children are allowed to discuss the con-
tents of the book and the social problems it portrays. They can do everything but read it.
This in my mind lessens somewhat the contention that the subject matter of the books is
not proper." Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
248. 457 F.2d at 293. ("This concept of a book acquiring tenure by shelving is indeed
novel and unsupportable under any theory of constitutional law we can discover").
249. Id.
250. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
251. Id. at 579.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 582-83.
254. Id. at 580-82. For example, see recommendation 7 of Dr. Cain's minority report:
"Finally, it is recommended that the McGuffey Readers be bought as supplemental readers
for enrichment program purposes for the elementary schools, since they seem to offer so
many advantages in vocabulary, content and sentence structure over the drivel being pushed
today." Id. at 582.
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ment terms, the removal must have been related solely to board
members' social and political opinions," 55 and was thus inconsis-
tent with students' first amendment rights.
Minarcini was also important for the introduction into the sec-
ondary school setting of the "right to receive" concept. The court
quoted a long passage from Virginia State Board v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumers Council,'"6 a case which had invalidated a state
statute prohibiting as unprofessional the advertising by pharma-
cists of prescription drug prices. The quoted passage listed "right
to receive" cases, and explained that the first amendment protects
the communication itself, thus extending reciprocal rights to the
speaker and the recipient.157 The Minarcini court concluded that
this right to know was correctly extended to students, although it
did not describe the application of the right to the school context
in general terms. 58
Finally, the Seventh Circuit in Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Corp.25" focused strongly on the first amendment rights of
students, in an attempt to work out a way in which these rights
could be reconciled to the secondary school setting. 60 Plaintiffs
had alleged that the school board violated their first and four-
teenth amendment rights by removing books from the curriculum
and from the library, by eliminating certain courses, and by failing
to rehire two teachers.2" 1 The court suggested two factors which
narrow the scope of academic freedom in elementary and second-
ary schools: the students' lack of intellectual development requires
that they be directed and guided in order that they may properly
approach the "marketplace of ideas," and these schools provide so-
cietal indoctrination as well as intellectual stimulation.26' These
factors represent, in essence, court recognition of the schools' in-
culcative function. The court, in an echo of Epperson v. Arkan-
255. Id.
256. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). This case was believed by one student commentator to be
that from which the concept of the right to receive information is primarily derived. See 34
VAND. L. REv. 1407, 1414 (1981).
257. 541 F.2d at 583.
258. Id.
259. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
260. Id. at 1304-05.
261. Id. at 1302-03.
262. Id. at 1304. Discussions of academic freedom in the university context are not
uniformly seen by the courts as transferable to the elementary or secondary school setting.
See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See generally 102 S. Ct. at
2830-31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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sas,2 3 stated that court interference was improper so long as edu-
cational choices were not being made from a desire to indoctrinate
students with a particular system of belief.2 64 The court explicitly
asserted that it would generally be permissible for educational de-
cisions to be based upon personal social, moral or political stan-
dards of board members. 65 The Zykan court reviewed the conflict-
ing responses of the courts to the issue of "book tenure,' '26 and
ultimately rejected the concept,2 67 following Presidents Council
and the district court's holding in Pico.26 It noted, however, that
the issues raised by the case were sufficiently unusual that plain-
tiffs should be given leave to amend to see if they could bring their
claim up to the level of a constitutional issue.6 9
On the same day that Pico was decided in the court of appeals,
the same panel of judges, divided along different lines,2 70 decided
Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Board of Directors.7 1
That case involved the removal from the school library of Dog Day
Afternoon by Patrick Mann and The Wanderers by Richard Price.
The court concluded that plaintiffs' allegations were insufficient to
warrant a trial on the issue of whether there had been a risk of
suppression of ideas, and a resulting first amendment violation, in
these removals. 2 It pointed out that there was no suggestion that
the books had been removed because of the ideas they con-
tained,73  or that the board had acted out of political
motivations. 74
263. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
264. 631 F.2d at 1306.
265. Id. at 1305.
266. Id. at 1308.
267. Id.
268. 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The district court in Pico had relied on Presi-
dents Council. District Judge Pratt cited with approval the Presidents Council court's use
of the Epperson standard, its conclusion that because the books or their contents had not
been banned altogether, there was no direct infringement of the first amendment right, and
its rejection of the concept of book tenure. Id. at 394-95.
269. 631 F.2d at 1309.
270. In Pico, District Judge Sifton filed the opinion for the court with Circuit Judge
Newman concurring and Circuit Judge Mansfield dissenting. 638 F.2d at 404-05. In Bick-
nell, Judge Newman filed the opinion for the court, Judge Mansfield concurred and Judge
Sifton dissented. 638 F.2d 438, 439 (1980).
271. 638 F.2d at 438 (1980).
272. Id. at 441. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint.





Bicknell, like Pico, involved allegations of irregularities in the
removal process. In Bicknell, appellant student asserted a separate
violation of due process in alleging that the board had disregarded
its established removal procedures, as set forth in a statement of
policy and procedures for library operation. 7 5 In Pico, the court of
appeals itself considered the extremely irregular removal proce-
dure as an element in making out a prima facie case of first
amendment violation,2 7 6 and a factor which distinguished the case
from Presidents Council.277 Judge Sifton, in his dissent in Bick-
nell, asserted that he could see no reason for distinguishing Pico.
He would have remanded Bicknell as well, to allow plaintiffs to
probe the reasons for the procedural irregularities, and their rela-
tionship to the substantive justifications given by the board for the
removals.
2 78
By these cases, the terms upon which the Supreme Court would
examine Pico were established: the clash of traditional ideas of lo-
cal school board authority and inculcative purpose with the first
amendment rights of students; the interpretation of students' right
to receive ideas; and the acceptance or rejection of the book tenure
concept.
27 9
While Justice Brennan acknowledged at the outset of his opinion
the limitations on the Court's review of a denial of summary judg-
ment,280 he expressly stated that the Constitutional issues were
more worthy of attention than a narrow review would permit.'81
Justice Brennan's opinion was significant both for what it under-
took and for what it neglected. He placed great emphasis on the
"right to receive" doctrine, and supported this emphasis by a long
list of cases related to the concept,28 2 but did not explicitly relate
275. Id.
276. 638 F.2d 404 at 414-15.
277. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972). See 638 F.2d 404 at 413.
278. 638 F.2d 438 at 442-43 (Sifton, J., dissenting).
279. See generally Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979)
(Board's removal of Ms. magazine from library not based on legitimate state interest; court
enjoined further removals and ordered replacement of censored issues and renewal of sub-
scription); Right to Read Comm. of Chelsea v. School Comm. of Chelsea, 454 F. Supp. 703
(D. Mass. 1978) (removal from library of anthology on basis of board members' personal
determination that its contents were offensive held an infringement of students' first
amendment rights). These cases purported to distinguish Presidents Council.
280. 102 S. Ct. at 2805. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
281. 102 S. Ct. at 2805. Justice Rehnquist disagreed. See supra notes 179-81 and ac-
companying text.
282. 102 S. Ct. at 2808. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text; see also supra




these cases to the school setting.283 Justice Brennan did not men-
tion Virginia State Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Coun-
cil,2 84 a leading case in the development of the concept of the right
to receive, and one discussed in two earlier book removal cases.28
The court in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District88 had
quoted Virginia State Board to support the extension of a first
amendment right to know to students,28 7 but without any in-depth
discussion of how to adapt the general parameters of that right to
the school environment. Four years later, the Seventh Circuit, in
Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp.2 88 also cited Virginia
State Board for what it termed "the qualified 'freedom to hear'
that has lately emerged as a constitutional concept", 289 but placed
limits on the right to receive based on students' lack of intellectual
capacity2 90 and on the legitimate community interest in providing
students with social, political and moral guidance.9 1
Justice Rehnquist did not refer to either Minarcini or Zykan in
his extensive criticism of Justice Brennan's use of the right to re-
ceive doctrine. Yet he pointed out the plurality's failure to do what
the Minarcini court also neglected,2 92 that is, to forge a clear link
between the doctrine as it had developed in cases not involving
school contexts, and a conclusion that it should also apply to stu-
dents. Justice Rehnquist also adopted a form of the Zykan limita-
tions, and faulted the plurality for inadequately realizing the im-
plications of these limitations.293
Justice Brennan did not deal in depth with two of the problems
engendered by the right to receive approach: the difficulty in dis-
tinguishing between removal decisions regarding texts and those
regarding library books,24 and the same difficulty with respect to
283. 102 S. Ct. at 2808. Justice Brennan used Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commu-
nity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) as the stepping-stone between the right to receive
cases and the rights of students.
284. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
285. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980);
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
286. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
287. Id. at 583.
288. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980).
289. Id. at 1304.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. 102 S. Ct. at 2830-31.
293. Id. at 2832.
294. See Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d at 580-83 for a discus-
sion of the role of the school library and its relation to the right to receive; but note that
there is no attempt to make an analytical distinction between texts and library books.
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removals versus acquisitions."' While Justice Brennan approached
the first issue by emphasizing the special role of the school library
as a forum for free inquiry while tacitly acknowledging the board's
authority to control the classroom environment, 96 he did not ade-
quately explore the concept of book tenure. Instead, he asserted
that his concern over suppression of ideas properly limited his
analysis to the implications of book removals only 2 7-a position
attacked by the Chief Justice 9 8 and by Justice Rehnquist 9 9 Jus-
tice Brennan's neglect of book tenure is particularly noticeable in
light of the fact that one of the factors which brought the case
before the court was the conflict in the circuits relating to their
acceptance or rejection of book tenure,300 and another was Pico's
conflict with the earlier Second Circuit decision in Presidents
Council v. Community School Board"'1 on this point.302
Justices Burger, Brennan, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Powell all
treated the local school board as a unique arm of the government,
and agreed that in it are lodged broad discretionary powers, a duty
to see that community values are inculcated, and an ability to re-,
spond to community needs. The Justices balanced these powers in
various ways with first amendment rights of students. The dissent-
ing opinions were noticeable in their concern that teenagers, rather
than school officials, would be able to exercise power over book-
related decisions.303 However, it is the parents of these teenagers
who bring court actions, and who normally would be expected to
do so only after failure of valid administrative procedures. Had the
plurality provided guidance for the establishment of such proce-
dures, the courts would not be required to act as "super censor,"
but could review board actions for compliance with administrative
295. See 102 S. Ct. at 2805-06, where Justice Brennan stated the posture of the plural-
ity: "Rather, the only action challenged in this case is the removal from school libraries of
books originally placed there by the school authorities, or without objection by them." Id.
See also supra note 148 and accompanying text, and supra note 195 and accompanying text.
296. 102 S. Ct. at 2809.
297. Id. at 2810. His language was, "[b]ecause we are concerned in this case with the
suppression of ideas, our holding today affects only the discretion to remove books." Id.
(emphasis in original).
298. 102 S. Ct. at 2821. The Chief Justice asked, "Why does the coincidence of timing
become the basis of a constitutional holding?" Id.
299. 102 S. Ct. at 2833. He stated, "If Justice Brennan truly has found a 'right to
receive ideas,' . . . this distinction between acquisition and removal makes little sense." Id.
300. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
301. 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
302. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.




guidelines - guidelines recognizing parental input through par-
ents' election of school officials whose standards reflected their
own.
Justice Brennan outlined the relevant inquiry to be made by the
district court on remand: whether the board's decision had been
primarily motivated by an intention to deny students access to
ideas with which the board disagreed. If this had been the case, the
removal had been in violation of students' constitutional rights.30"
Based on this analysis, Justice Brennan concluded that there was a
genuine issue of- material fact remaining as to the basis on which
petitioners had actually made their removal decision.30 5 Yet if the
Court's role was to have established a clear standard to guide the
district court, there is validity to Chief Justice Burger's dissatisfac-
tion with this standard.30 6 Perhaps the result of this decision will
not be so much to aid courts in the evaluation of the actions of
school boards as to aid school boards in framing their reasons for
book removals - whatever they might actually be - in constitu-
tionally acceptable terms: pervasive vulgarity, educational unsuita-
bility; and in avoiding the sorts of irregular procedures to which
both the plurality opinion in this case and the court of appeals in
Pico objected.
It will be impossible as well to see how the plurality's standard
would have been worked through in this case. As an article by UPI
Staff Writer Anne Saker reported:"" "In mid-August (1982), the
Island Trees School Board decided to avoid further legal action
and put the books back on the shelves - but librarians are re-
quired to notify parents if their children check the books out."0
Courts, school boards and scholars will therefore have to await
other cases in the area to see if the Supreme Court's standard can
be practically applied.
Sandra Preuhs
304. 102 S. Ct. at 2810.
305. Id. at 2812.
306. Id. at 2822. (Powell, J., dissenting).
307. The Pittsburgh Press, September 26, 1982, at C-2, col. 1.
308. Id.
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